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Abstract                                                                                      
Semi-compatibilism regarding responsibility is the position according to which 
determinism is compatible with moral responsibility quite apart from whether 
determinism rules out the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possi-
bilities. I motivate the view that whether or not semi-compatiblism is viable turns 
on whether various prima facie attractive normative principles are true or false. 
I introduce a subset of these principles. I then map out some positions regarding 
the tenability of semi-compatibilism depending upon which of these principles, if 
any, is true. I conclude that for many, the price of maintaining semi-compatibilism 
may be too steep because maintaining semi-compatibilism requires abandoning 
one or more of the principles in this subset.
Keywords: Semi-compatibilism, moral responsibility, alternative 
possibilities, choice, normative principles.
Resumen
El semicompatibilismo respecto de la responsabilidad es la posición según la cual 
el determinismo es compatible con la responsabilidad moral, independientemente 
de si aquel excluye el tipo de libertad que requiere acceso a posibilidades alternati-
vas. Sugiero que la respuesta a la pregunta acerca de si el semicompatibilismo es o 
no viable, descansa en si una variedad de principios normativos —atractivos prima 
facie— es verdadera o falsa. Presento un subconjunto de estos principios y, luego, 
rastreo algunas posiciones con respecto a la sostenibilidad del semicompatibilismo, 
dependiendo de cuál de estos principios, si acaso alguno, es verdadero. Concluyo 
que para muchos el precio de mantener el semicompatibilismo es demasiado alto 
porque hacerlo requiere abandonar uno o más principios de este subconjunto. 
Palabras clave: semicompatibilismo, responsabilidad moral, posibilidades 
alternativas, elección, principios normativos. 
1. Introduction
Understand determinism as the thesis that for any instant, 
there is exactly one physically possible future (cf. van Inwagen 3). 
The Consequence Argument, or at least a suitable variant of it, gives
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us strong reason to believe that if determinism is true, then our 
actions are not “up to us” in the sense that both we could have per-
formed them and we could have refrained from performing them; 
determinism, if some variation of this argument is sound, precludes 
alternatives.1 Peter van Inwagen summarizes the crux of his version 
of the Consequence Argument in this way:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the 
laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what 
went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of 
nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our 
present acts) are not up to us. (16)
If, in turn, moral responsibility requires alternatives, in par-
ticular, if this principle is true:
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP-R): Persons are 
morally responsible for what they have done only if they could 
have done otherwise (see Frankfurt 829), 
then determinism may well threaten responsibility by virtue of 
ruling out alternatives.
Whether this threat is a bona fide one depends crucially on 
the sorts of alternative at issue. Distinguish between strong and 
weak alternatives (or, alternatively, between a strong or incompati-
bilist sense of “can” and a weak or compatibilist sense of “can”). 
If you could have done other than what you in fact did consistent 
with holding fixed the past and the laws, then your alternative is 
a strong alternative. More carefully, suppose agent, s, does action, 
a, at time, t, in world, w. Agent s has a strong alternative at t if the 
combination of w’s past and w’s laws of nature is consistent with 
s’s not a-ing at t. Determinism effaces strong alternatives; no one 
has such alternatives in a deterministic world, or at least I take it 
that the Consequence Argument (or a suitable incarnation of it) 
establishes that this is so. Weak alternatives are alternatives that 
you can have despite determinism’s being true. On one concep-
tion of weak alternatives, for instance, although some agent, Mary, 
does one thing —she protests against the use of pesticides— she 
would have refrained from protesting had she wanted, or tried, or 
chosen not to protest. If PAP-R is true, and responsibility requires 
only weak alternatives as some compatibilists have proposed, then 
the conclusion of the Consequence Argument —determinism ef-
faces alternative— in conjunction with the principle of alternate 
possibilities does not commit us to the skeptical view that no one 
is ever morally responsible for anything that one does.
1 On the Consequence Argument, see, for e. g., Ginet (1966, 1990, 2003); van Inwagen; 
Fischer (1994).
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Given these two types of alternative, it is not surprising that in the 
free will debate, different parties have frequently found themselves at 
an impasse over whether determinism does indeed undermine moral 
responsibility by way of ruling out alternatives. These parties have ar-
rived at this impasse because, often (but not always), concurring that 
responsibility requires alternatives, they have disagreed on whether 
the alternatives are weak or strong.2 An alluring feature of semi-com-
patibilism is that it promises to break this impasse.
Take “Compatibilism-R” to be the thesis that determinism is 
compatible with moral responsibility, and take “Incompatibilism-R” 
to be the denial of Compatibilism-R. John Fischer explains that semi-
compatibilism (or what we may label “semi-compatibilism regarding 
responsibility”) is the position that determinism is compatible with 
moral responsibility quite apart from whether determinism rules out 
the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possibilities 
(Fischer & Ravizza 52-53; Fischer 2006 76-78; Fischer 2007 56). The 
semi-compatibilist does not deny that responsibility presupposes our 
having freedom or control; rather, she denies that this control is of the 
type that requires our having access to alternatives, irrespective of the 
alternatives being strong or weak.
Fischer and other semi-compatibilists have relied heavily (though 
not exclusively) on Frankfurt examples to energize semi-compati-
bilism. These examples, directed against the principle of alternate 
possibilities, purport to show that a person can, for instance, be mor-
ally praiseworthy for doing something despite not being able to do 
otherwise, as long as the conditions that render her unable to do oth-
erwise play no role in bringing about her action (see Frankfurt).
How viable is semi-compatibilism? To make tackling this diffi-
cult issue more manageable, let’s provisionally assume that Frankfurt 
examples do indeed impugn the principle of alternate possibilities. 
We will revisit this assumption later. My modest aim in this paper 
is to motivate the view that the rational credentials of semi-com-
patiblism turn on whether various other normative principles are 
true or false. I introduce some (certainly not all) of these principles. 
I then map out three positions regarding the viability of semi-com-
patibilism, the tenability of each depending upon whether a subset 
of these principles is true.
2. Reason and Responsibility
a. Responsibility, Obligation, and Reason
Many theorists believe that the following principles that, they 
claim, expose conceptual connections between moral obligation and 
moral responsibility are true:
2 A highly informative summary of some of the relevant issues concerning such an 
impasse can be found in Kane (ch. 4).
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Praiseworthiness presupposes Obligation (po): An agent, s, is 
morally praiseworthy for doing something, a, only if it is overall 
morally obligatory or overall morally permissible for s to do a.
Blameworthiness presupposes Wrongness (BO): An agent, 
s, is morally blameworthy for doing something, a, only if it is 
overall morally wrong for s to do a.3
Should there be a requirement of alternative possibilities for the 
truth of judgments of moral obligation, right, or wrong (or, in short, 
should there be such a requirement for the truth of morally deontic 
judgments), then if PO and BO are true, semi-compatibilism is not 
viable. I believe that moral obligation does, indeed, require alterna-
tives. The gist of my argument for this view crystallizes to this:
(P1) Obligations are tied to reasons (OR): If an agent has a 
moral obligation to do something, a, then the agent has an ob-
jective pro tanto reason to do a.
(P2) Reasons are tied to alternatives: If an agent has an ob-
jective pro tanto reason to do something, a, then the agent could 
have done other than a.
Therefore:
(C) If an agent has a moral obligation to do something, a, 
then the agent could have done other than a.
As I have explained this argument in detail elsewhere (Haji 
forthcoming), my commentary here will be relatively brief. 
Regarding the first premise, I offer little on the concept of ob-
ligation save that as it occurs in principle OR, ‘obligation’ refers to 
“objective” all in moral obligation. All in or overall moral obligation 
is opposed to prima facie obligation. Objective obligation is meant 
to contrast with subjective obligation: an agent has a subjective ob-
ligation to do something if and only if she believes that she has an 
(objective) obligation to do this thing.
The concept of something’s being a reason is more involved. 
Understand ‘a reason’ in the principle to denote an objective pro tan-
to practical reason. Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have 
our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. Pro 
tanto reasons are reasons that can be outweighed by other reasons, 
as opposed to all-things considered reasons (or “oughts”), which 
cannot be outweighed. If the term ‘reason’ means pro tanto reason, 
each reason has a certain weight. Suppose that, on a particular oc-
casion, you have several different alternatives. Suppose, further, that 
your pro tanto reasons to act in some way are stronger —perhaps far 
more so— than your reasons to act in any other way. Then you have 
3 See, for instance, Smith (1991 279); Widerker (1991 223); Fields (408-09); Copp (1997); 
Copp (2003 286-287); Fischer (2006 218).
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most reason to act in this way; the reasons you have to act in this way 
outweigh the reasons you have not to act in this way. We may say that 
acting in this way is reasons-wise obligatory for you; you reasons-
wise ought to act in this way. (In more common parlance, we might 
say that you have decisive reason to act in this way.) Suppose that, on 
a different occasion, you have sufficient or enough pro tanto reason 
to act in two or more ways, and no better reason to act in any other 
way. Then we may say that it is reasons-wise permissible or right for 
you to act in either of these ways. Finally, suppose you have most pro 
tanto reason not to act in a certain way. Then we may say that acting 
in this way is reasons-wise wrong or forbidden for you (or that you 
have decisive reason not to act in this way).4 In what follows, depart-
ing from common usage and unless otherwise specified, I take pro 
tanto reasons to denote “agent external” objective reasons. 
Objective pro tanto reasons contrast with subjective pro tanto 
reasons: as ‘subjective pro tanto reason’ is to be interpreted in the 
remainder of this paper, an agent has such a reason to do something 
if and only if the agent believes that she has an objective pro tanto 
reason to do that thing. To bring out the distinction between objec-
tive pro tanto reasons and subjective pro tanto reasons, imagine that 
you nonculpably believe that you have most pro tanto reason to take 
some pills that are in the experimental stage of development because 
you (nonculpably) believe, on the advice of the medical team, that 
the pills will assuage your pain. But in fact you reasons-wise ought 
not to take these pills because (unbeknown to the doctors) taking the 
pills will kill you. Though you have no (objective) pro tanto reason to 
take the pills, you have subjective reason to do so. Pro tanto reasons 
are also to be differentiated from what may be dubbed “Davidsonian 
reasons”; these are, roughly, complexes of desires and beliefs.
Why believe, though, that obligations are tied to objective pro 
tanto reasons and not either to subjective reasons or to Davidsonian 
reasons? The crux of the matter is that the view that some things 
are morally wrong or morally obligatory for an agent irrespective, 
roughly, of what desires or beliefs that agent has is compelling.5 You 
may believe, on the evidence available to you, that giving medi-
cine M to a sick patient will cure the patient. But if giving M will 
in fact kill the patient, you do wrong in giving M. You do wrong 
despite your subjective reason: you believe (let’s assume) that you 
have a pro tanto reason to give M, whereas in fact you have no such 
reason. Indeed, you have decisive pro tanto reason not to give M. 
Similarly, you do wrong despite your pertinent Davidsonian reasons: 
4 An instructive paper on, among other things, pro tanto reasons is Broome.
5 I realize that this claim would be rejected by those people —Bernard Williams, for 
example, and more recently Mark Schroeder— who think that pro tanto reasons in 
some way depend on desires.
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you desire to cure the patient and you believe that you can cure the 
patient by administering M; your having of this desire and belief 
(in conjunction with other pertinent antecedents of action) causally 
(and non-deviantly) issues in your giving M. None of this, though, 
need tell against your act not being wrong for you.6
b. Reason and Alternative Possibilities
Turning, next, to the second premise, the premise that there is 
a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments 
of pro tanto reasons, if you have most moral reason to do some-
thing, a, and, thus, if morality requires that you do a, then you can 
do a. In other words, the moral “ought” implies “can.” Suppose, 
now, that you have most (practical) reason to do a; as we said, you 
ought to do a from the point of view of reason. Then it seems that 
you can do a. You cannot have an “obligation” —it cannot be nec-
essary— from the point of view of reason, for you to do something 
if you cannot do that thing.
So it seems that just as there is an association between the 
“ought” of morality and “can,” there is a similar association between 
the “ought” of reason and “can.” Indeed, the moral “ought” implies 
“can” principle appears just to be a more restricted version of the 
following general principle:
Reasons-Wise “Ought” Implies “Can” (KR): If one has most 
reason to do something, a, and, thus, if one reasons-wise ought 
to do a, then one can do a.
If reasons-wise “ought” implies “can,” I see no reason to deny that 
reasons-wise “wrong” (and reasons-wise “right”) imply “can” as well. 
As a preliminary remark regarding what may be provided as sup-
port for this view, the moral “ought” implies “can” principle, where 
“ought” expresses all in moral obligation, can be put in this way:
(MK): If it is morally obligatory for one to do something, then 
one can do it; and if it is morally obligatory for one to refrain 
from doing something, then one can refrain from doing it.
It has been emphasized that moral responsibility requires 
control; if you are morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy 
for an action, then you have responsibility-relevant control 
6 Some may, of course, say that if a doctor gives a medicine to a patient that the doctor 
sincerely and responsibly believes will cure the patient, what the doctor does is not 
wrong even if it turns out that the medicine unexpectedly kills the patient. Intuitions 
about these sorts of cases can conflict. I’m inclined to claim that the doctor does 
objective wrong (but is not blameworthy); and that the doctor fulfils his subjective 
obligation: she does what she believes she has an objective obligation to do. Insightful 
discussion on this issue is to be found in Zimmerman (2008).
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in performing this action. Similarly, think of principle MK as a 
control principle for moral obligation; if you have a moral obligation 
to perform an action, then you have obligation-relevant control in 
performing it.
If we conceive of the moral “ought” implies “can” principle in 
this way —as a principle of control— then barring persuasive rea-
sons to believe otherwise, there is little reason not to assume, too, 
that moral “wrong” (and moral “right”) imply “can.” I advance, spe-
cifically, two considerations in favor of this view. First, as we have 
registered, just as moral praiseworthiness and moral blameworthi-
ness require control (or freedom), so does moral obligation, moral 
wrong, and moral right. The control requirements of blameworthi-
ness, unless we have sound reason to believe the contrary, mirror 
those of praiseworthiness: both have the same freedom require-
ments. An essential element of the freedom requirement of these 
responsibility appraisals is captured by these principles: one is mor-
ally praiseworthy for doing something only if one could have done 
that thing; and, similarly, one is morally blameworthy for doing 
something only if one could have done that thing. These principles 
highlight a link between moral responsibility and freedom, a link 
that holds of conceptual necessity. Similarly, it would seem that the 
control or freedom requirements of moral obligation, unless we have 
strong reason to think otherwise (and I know of no such reason), 
should also be the very ones of moral wrong and moral right. If the 
“ought” implies “can” principle expresses just one more incarnation 
of the association between morality and freedom, then, again, in the 
absence of special reason to believe otherwise, it should also be the 
case that the principles that “wrong” implies “can” and that “right” 
implies “can” express two other instances of this association.
Second, this symmetry in the freedom or control requirements of 
obligation, wrong, and right is validated by a powerful analysis of the 
concept of moral obligation, an analysis informed largely by the work 
of Fred Feldman (1986) and Michael Zimmerman (1996) on the mor-
ally deontic “ought." The analysis provides a plausible treatment of a 
wide array of deontic puzzles, sometimes partly in virtue of implying 
that “wrong” implies “can” (see, for e.g., Feldman 1990; Zimmerman 
1996). The account builds on the idea that at each time of moral choice, 
there are several possible worlds accessible to a person as of that time: 
there are, at the time, various ways in which a person might live out 
her life. For each of these complete “life histories,” there is a possible 
world —the one that would exist if she were to live out her life in that 
way. Roughly, a possible world is accessible to a person at a time if 
and only if it is still possible, at that time, for the person to see to the 
occurrence of that world. A world may be accessible to a person at a 
time, but once the person behaves in some way other than the way in 
which he behaves in that world, it is no longer accessible; it has been 
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“bypassed.” Once bypassed, a world never again becomes accessible. 
As a person moves through life, she inexorably pares down the stock 
of worlds accessible to her.
Making use of the notion of accessibility, one can say that a state 
of affairs is possible for a person as of a time if and only if it occurs 
in some world still accessible to the person at that time. Let ‘Ks,t,p’ 
abbreviate ‘there is a world accessible to s as of t in which state of 
affairs p occurs.’ ‘Ks,t,p’ is equivalent to ‘as of t, s can still see to the 
occurrence of p.’
On this analysis, actions are morally judged not by appeal to 
the value of their outcomes, but by appeal to the values of the ac-
cessible possible worlds in which they are performed. Worlds may 
be ranked in accordance to a value-relation; each world is as good 
as, or better than, or worse than, each other world. A world is best 
if no world is better than it is. For purposes of “value-wise” rank-
ing worlds, one can supply one’s favorite axiology. I simply label 
the relevant value “deontic value.” Some may opt for the view that 
deontic value consists in intrinsic value; others might claim that 
such value is tied to compliance with the categorical imperative; 
still others might offer yet another view. The analysis can now be 
stated in this way:
(MO): A person, s, ought, as of t, to see to the occurrence of 
a state of affairs, p, if and only if p occurs in some world, w, ac-
cessible to s at t, and it’s false that not-p occurs in any accessible 
world deontically as good as or deontically better than w.7
More intuitively (and simplifying somewhat), according to (MO), 
as of some time, an act is morally obligatory for you, if and only if 
you can do it and it occurs in all the bests accessible to you at this 
time. As of some time, an act is morally permissible for you if and 
only if you can do it and it occurs in some but not all the bests ac-
cessible to you as of this time. And, as of some time, an act is wrong 
for you if and only if you can do it and it does not occur in any of the 
bests accessible to you as of this time.
(MO) verifies a version of “ought” implies “can.” Allowing K to 
express the relevant sort of possibility, this implication relation can be 
stated as follows: MOs,t,p implies Ks,t,p. MOs,t,p means that there is an 
accessible p-world such that there is no as good accessible not-p world. 
Hence, there is an accessible p-world. This means that Kstp is true as 
well. Similarly, given (MO), if as of some time p is wrong for you, p oc-
curs in some world that is accessible to you but not in any of the best 
worlds accessible to you. So, on (MO), “wrong” implies “can” as well.
7 Zimmerman constructs and defends an analysis similar to Feldman’s in his 1996, 
ch. 2. In his recent book (2008), he advances a different analysis but one which still 
validates the “wrong” implies “can” thesis.
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In sum we have good reason to believe that each of “moral 
ought,” “moral right,” and “moral wrong” implies “can.”
Reverting, now, to reasons-wise obligation, the reasons-wise 
“ought” implies “can” principle, just like the moral “ought” implies 
“can” principle expresses the control that “obligations” of reason 
require. There is, it seems, no reason to believe that the control re-
quirements of the moral “ought” differ from those of the reasons 
“ought.” As I previously ventured, the moral “ought” implies “can” 
principle is just a special case of the general principle that reasons-
wise “ought” implies “can.” And, again, precluding compelling 
reasons to think otherwise, if reasons-wise “ought” requires a species 
of control, reasons-wise “right” and reasons-wise “wrong” require 
this very species of control as well: if it is reasons-wise right (or rea-
sons-wise wrong) for you to do something, then you can do it.
We may now proceed to show that there is a requirement 
of alternative possibilities for reasons-wise right, reasons-wise 
wrong, and reasons-wise obligation. Recall principle KR:
(KR): If one has most reason to do something, a, and, thus, 
if one reasons-wise ought to do a, then one can do a.
KR’s corollary is:
Reasons-Wise “Ought Not” Implies “Can Refrain From” 
(KRC): If one reasons-wise ought not to do something, a, then 
one can refrain from doing a.
Further, we should, I believe, accept this principle (Reason-1):
Reasons-Wise “Ought Not” amounts to Reasons-Wise 
“Wrong” (Reason-1): One reasons-wise ought not to do a if and 
only if it is reasons-wise wrong for one to do a.
One would think that to say that some action is reasons-wise 
wrong (or reasons-wise forbidden) for you is just to say that you rea-
sons-wise ought —you have decisive reason— not to do it (or reason 
requires that you not do it). But then it would seem that it is reasons-
wise obligatory for you not to do an act —reason requires that you 
not do it— if and only if it is reasons-wise wrong for you to do it; this 
is just what Reason-1 says.
From KRC and Reasons-1, we derive:
Reasons-Wise Wrongness Requires Alternatives (Reason-2): 
If it is reasons-wise wrong for one to do a, then one can refrain 
from doing a.
Reason-2, in conjunction with the claim that reasons-wise 
“wrong” implies “can,” establishes that there is a requirement of al-
ternative possibilities for reasons-wise wrongness.
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Consider, next, reasons-wise obligation. If it is reasons-wise 
obligatory for one to refrain from doing something, a, then it is 
reasons-wise wrong for one to do a (from Reason-1). Further, if 
it is reasons-wise wrong for one to do a, then one can do a (from 
the reasons-wise “wrong” implies “can” analogue of (KR): if it is 
reasons-wise wrong for one to do a, then one can do a.) Therefore, if 
it is reasons-wise obligatory for one to refrain from doing a, then 
one can do a. But it is also true that if it is reasons-wise obligatory 
for one to refrain from doing a, then one can refrain from doing a. 
In other words, just as there is a requirement of alternative possi-
bilities for reasons-wise wrongness, so there is such a requirement 
for reasons-wise obligation.
If reasons-wise wrongness and reasons-wise obligation require 
alternative possibilities, then I see little reason to deny that reasons-
why rightness, too, requires alternative possibilities. We conclude 
that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of 
judgments of objective pro tanto reasons.
c. Frankfurt Examples
We may now briefly comment on the assumption, previously 
made, that Frankfurt examples cast doubt on the principle of alter-
nate possibilities. We may conceive of such an example as unfolding 
in two stages. In Stage 1, an agent, Mary, decides to do something, x, 
and intentionally x-s. (For instance, she decides to protest against 
the use of pesticides in lawn fertilizers and intentionally protests). 
We are to assume that whether you are a libertarian or a compati-
bilist, on your account of free action and moral responsibility, Stage 
1 Mary is morally responsible for deciding to x (and for x-ing). In 
Stage 2, the scenario is developed in a way in which something 
ensures that Mary (Stage 2 Mary) decides to x —this thing suppos-
edly precludes Mary from deciding to do other than x— without 
in any way interfering in Mary’s deciding to x. We are meant to 
draw the conclusion that since Stage 1 Mary is morally responsible 
for deciding to x, and since Stage 2 Mary does not differ relevantly 
from Stage 1 Mary with respect to deciding to x, Stage 2 Mary is 
also morally responsible for deciding to x even though she could 
not have refrained from deciding to x (cf. Frankfurt 835-36).8
Regarding such examples, two points merit emphasis. First, 
Mary protests for reasons in Stage 1. Assume (though I think this 
assumption is open to doubt) that these reasons are objective pro 
tanto reasons. If it is such reasons that causally issue in her deciding 
to protest, then owing to there being a requirement of alternative 
possibilities for the having of pro tanto reasons, she could have 
8 The literature on Frankfurt examples is voluminous. An excellent collection of papers 
on Frankfurt examples is to be found in Widerker & McKenna (2003).
 On the Viability of Semi-Compatibilism [135]
Ideas y Valores • número 141 • DICIEMBRE de 2009 • ISSN 0120-0062 • Bogotá, Colombia
done other than decide to protest. Provided all (relevant) alterna-
tives are expunged in Stage 2, Mary’s deciding to protest in Stage 
2 could not have causally issued from her having of objective pro 
tanto reasons. Some theorists who are inclined toward the view that 
all reasons are, in the end, objective pro tanto reasons, should not 
accept one alleged moral of Frankfurt examples to wit, the prin-
ciple of alternate possibilities is false. Other theorists who accept 
the view that having (objective) pro tanto reasons requires having 
access to alternatives might argue that another lesson to be learned 
from Frankfurt examples (in addition, that is, to the lesson that 
responsibility does not require alternatives) is that although re-
sponsibility presupposes our having of reasons —if one is morally 
responsible for doing something, then one has a reason for doing 
this thing— responsibility does not presuppose our having (objec-
tive) pro tanto reasons; perhaps responsibility only presupposes 
possession of Davidsonian reasons.
Second, imagine that Mary is putatively morally praiseworthy 
for doing what she supposedly cannot, in her situation, avoid doing 
(deciding to protest). If PO, though, is true —if moral praiseworthi-
ness requires moral obligation or moral permissibility— but there 
is a requirement of alternative possibilities for morally deontic 
judgments, then it would seem that Frankfurt-examples are not as 
decisive as one might initially have thought them to be.9
3. Hard Choices
Let’s now collect a subset of the various principles that we have 
introduced in our discussion so far. 
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP-R): Persons are 
morally responsible for what they have done only if they could 
have done otherwise.
Praiseworthiness presupposes Obligation (PO): An agent, s, 
is morally praiseworthy for doing something, a, only if it is 
overall morally obligatory or overall morally permissible for 
s to do a.
Blameworthiness presupposes Wrongness (BO): An agent, s, is 
morally blameworthy for doing something, a, only if it is overall 
morally wrong for s to do a.
The Moral “Ought” Implies “Can” (MK): If it is morally obliga-
tory for an agent, s, to do something, a, then s can do a; and if it is 
morally obligatory for s to refrain from doing a, then s can refrain 
from doing a.
9 It might be ventured that if Frankfurt examples impugn the principle of alternate 
possibilities, they also impugn the principle that a person has a moral obligation to do 
something only if she could have done otherwise. I believe, though, that this charge 
can be met (cf. Haji 2002 46-47; Haji 2003; Haji forthcoming).
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Obligations are tied to reasons (OR): If an agent, s, has a moral 
obligation to do something, a, then s has an objective pro tanto 
reason to do a.
The Reasons Cluster:
Reasons-Wise “Ought” Implies “Can” (KR): If an agent, s, has 
most reason to do something, a, and, thus, if s reasons-wise 
ought to do a, then s can do a. (There are parallel principles 
concerning reasons-wise “right” and reasons-wise “wrong.”)
Reasons-Wise “Ought Not” Implies “Can Refrain From” 
(KRC): If an agent, s, reasons-wise ought not to do something, a, 
then s can refrain from doing a.
Reasons-Wise “Ought Not” amounts to Reasons-Wise 
“Wrong” (Reason-1): An agent, s, reasons-wise ought not to do a 
if and only if it is reasons-wise wrong for s to do a.
Reasons-Wise Wrongness Requires Alternatives (Reason-2): 
If it is reasons-wise wrong for an agent, s, to do a, then s can 
refrain from doing a. (Again, there are parallel principles con-
cerning reasons-wise “wrong” and reasons-wise “obligation.”)
To facilitate mapping out various positions concerning the 
viability of semi-compatibilism, assume that principle OR is true. 
It’s hard to see how one can deny this principle. Here are three 
relevant options:
Position 1: Accept PO, BO, and the principles in the Reasons 
Cluster. This position implies that semi-compatibilism is not viable. 
(More circumspectly, if PO, BO, and the principles in the Reasons 
Cluster are true, then semi-compatibilism is in jeopardy.) To ex-
plain: if moral praiseworthiness is tied to moral obligation or moral 
right, moral blameworthiness is tied to moral wrong, these deon-
tic evaluations are associated with pro tanto reasons in the manner 
explained in prior section 2B, and there is a requirement of alterna-
tive possibilities for the having of such reasons, then both moral 
praiseworthiness and moral blameworthiness presuppose our hav-
ing access to alternatives. If one accepts PO, BO, and the principles 
in the Reasons Cluster, then one should accept the principle of al-
ternate possibilities as well. (Or perhaps, more cautiously, if one 
accepts PO, BO, and the principles in the Reasons Cluster, then one 
should also accept the principle that persons are praiseworthy (or 
blameworthy) for what they have done only if they could have 
done otherwise.) One should, consequently, be suspicious about 
Frankfurt examples.10
10 Both Widerker (1991) and Copp (1997; 2003) accept BO, and (it appears) the principle 
that “ought” implies “can.” Partly on the basis of accepting these principles, Copp 
denies that Frankfurt examples undermine the principle that persons are morally 
blameworthy for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise
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Position 2: Accept PO and BO; discard KR. Just as some have 
rejected the moral “ought” implies “can” principle (MK), so these per-
sons may reject the reasons-wise “ought” implies “can” principle (KR). 
On this position, semi-compatibilism would be viable but at a cost 
some would deem too high.11
It may be worth noting the following. What we may call the 
“Obligation Cluster” is a set of principles with these members:
Moral “Ought” Implies “Can” (MK): If it is morally obliga-
tory for an agent, s, to do something, a, then s can do a; and if 
it is morally obligatory for s to refrain from doing something, 
a, then s can refrain from doing a. (There are parallel principles 
concerning moral “right” and moral “wrong.”) 
Moral “Ought” Implies “Can Refrain From” (MCR): If it is 
morally obligatory for an agent, s, to do something, a, then 
s can refrain from doing a; and if it is morally obligatory for 
s to refrain from doing a, then s can do a. (There are similar 
principles concerning moral “right” and moral “wrong.”) An 
argument structurally parallel to the one for the conclusion 
that reasons-wise “ought” implies reasons-wise “can refrain 
from,” in which occurrences of ‘reasons-wise “ought”’, ‘rea-
sons-wise “right”’, and ‘reasons-wise-wrong”’ are replaced by 
‘moral “ought”’, ‘moral “right”’, and ‘moral “wrong”’ establish-
es MCR (and the analogous principles concerning “right” and 
“wrong”.)
Should one accept PO, BO, and the principles in the Obligation 
Cluster, then again one should not accept semi-compatibilism. If 
one finds compelling the analysis of moral obligation that I adum-
brated above, one would, of course, rationally have to accept the 
Obligation Cluster. 
Position 3: Reject PO and BO; accept the Reasons Cluster, or the 
Obligation Cluster, or both these clusters). On this option, semi-
compatibilism is still in the running. This is the option that I favor 
(and for which I have argued elsewhere, e.g. Haji 2002), but some 
may find the price of renouncing PO and BO exceedingly high. On 
my view, moral praiseworthiness and moral blameworthiness are 
conceptually tied to (nonculpable) belief in what is overall morally 
obligatory, overall morally right, or overall morally wrong, and not 
to what is in fact overall obligatory, right, or wrong.
Worthy of mention is the following. Paul McNamara has 
developed and defended a deontic system for modeling the logi-
cal structure of fundamental features of common sense morality 
11 John Fischer endorses this position. More carefully, he accepts BO and the view that 
Frankfurt examples undermine pap-r but rejects the “ought” implies “can” principle. 
See, for e.g. Fischer (1999a; 1999b; 2003).
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(2008; forthcoming). A distinctive feature of his fascinating model 
is that it represents among other deontic notions, those of right, 
wrong, obligation, exceeding the moral minimum (cf. “action 
beyond the call of duty” or “supererogation”), and permissible 
suboptimality (cf. “suberogation”); as well as hypological (i. e., 
responsibility) notions such as praiseworthiness and blamewor-
thiness. The model validates the moral “ought” implies “can” 
principle, the moral “right” implies “can” principle, as well as the 
falsity of PO and BO.
In conclusion, I shall not here attempt to settle which of these 
three positions has the upper hand. I, like many others, have been 
drawn to semi-compatibilism. But as I hope this discussion clarifies, 
for many (but not for all of us) the price of endorsing semi-compati-
bilism might be too high.12
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